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TOWARD AN EXPANDED
CONCEPTION OF LAW REFORM:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FACTS
Holly B. Fechner*
Feminist theorists and activists spurred a dramatic change in
attitude over the past ten years that has forced courts to rethink
and reformulate sexual harassment law. Their work has en-
couraged more women' to bring sexual harassment claims, 2 pro-
voked society3 and legal decision makers" to see the facts of sex-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable John Feikens, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Michigan. Executive Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform, Volume 22, 1989; B.A., Oberlin College, 1985; J.D., University of Michigan Law
School, 1989.
I am grateful to Nancy Boocker, Tom Howlett, and Kim Lane Scheppele for their
generous help in preparing this piece.
1. The overwhelming majority of sexual harassment victims are women and the over-
whelming majority of perpetrators are men. Cf. Wide Harrassment of Women Working
for U.S. is Reported, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1988, at B6, col. 1 (reporting a survey of gov-
ernment workers in which 42% of female employees, as opposed to only 14% of male
employees, responded that they had experienced sexual harassment in the preceeding
two years). Although some men have experienced sexual harassment in the workplace
and some same-sex harassment occurs, this Note uses women as the paradigmatic exam-
ples of sexual harassment victims.
2. See Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled
and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 445, 458-62 (1981) (surveying the develop-
ment of and increase in sexual harassment case law); Kay & Brodsky, Protecting Women
from Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Book Review), 58 TEX. L. REV. 671, 687
(1980) ("The judgment by a person that he or she is being 'harassed' is subjective and,
like all such judgments, is determined in part by the range of behavior acceptable to the
culture."). But see K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF VICTIMS 109 (1988) (arguing that antidiscrimination ideology reinforces the victimiza-
tion of women and people of color because it requires acknowledging the powerlessness
associated with victim status).
3. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Board of Trustees, Statement on Discrimination
Based on Gender or Sexual Orientation, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1494, 1494 (1988) ("It is
well known that sexual harassment and other forms of irrational gender-based employ-
ment discrimination are potentially severe occupational stressors."); Crull, Stress Effects
of Sexual Harassment on the Job: Implications for Counseling, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 539, 541 (1982) (presenting results of a study of 262 women sexual harassment vic-
tims: "[A]lmost all of the women experienced debilitating stress reactions as a result of
the harassment," which affected their work performance and attitudes and their psycho-
logical and physical health); Goodman, supra note 2, at 446-48 (describing society's shift
in attitude regarding sexual harassment).
4. The broad term "legal decision makers" applies a lesson from the Legal Realists
that law is decided not only by judges, but by everyone, including, for example, adminis-
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ual harassment differently, and convinced the United States
Supreme Court to accept the hostile environment theory of sex-
ual harassment.'
The reform of sexual harassment law illustrates how society
has restricted itself to a conception of law reform that is too nar-
row. Law reformers concentrate on changing legal "doctrine,"
yet "facts" are just as important to legal decisions.' Changing
the way society and legal decision makers think about facts can
significantly affect legal decision making. In this way, feminists
used consciousness raising,' a methodology that alters how we
see facts, to reform sexual harassment law.8
trative agency bureaucrats who determine governmental benefits of applicants, prosecu-
tors who use their discretion to bring charges, police officers who use their discretion to
arrest, and individuals who choose to bring cases. On Legal Realism, see generally W.
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (University of Oklahoma ed.
1985).
5. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The United States Supreme
Court upheld what had become by 1986 virtually unanimous lower court rulings that
hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Catharine MacKinnon was the
primary proponent of using the hostile environment theory in sexual harassment cases.
Her work influenced attorneys bringing sexual harassment cases in lower courts to argue
the hostile environment theory, and she wrote the plaintiff's brief in Meritor. See also
infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
6. See K. LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAW 87 (1988) [hereinafter K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS] (arguing that law consists of
"legal texts" and "social texts" and both must be interpreted according to a theory);
Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, 44 n.14 (Spring
1990) [hereinafter Scheppele, Facing Facts] ("[L]egal interpretation does not rest on
some bedrock of facts. The interpretation of law and fact are mutually supporting 'all
the way down.' ").
The distinction between doctrine (legal rules) and facts is overstated in this paper for
the purpose of critiquing the standard view of law reform. No clear distinction as is
drawn here exists. One author describes an analogous relationship this way: "[F]acts are
small theories, and true theories are big facts." N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 97
(1978) (citing N. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958) (arguing that facts are theory-
laden)).
7. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of consciousness rais-
ing; see generally C. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105
(1989) [hereinafter C. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY].
8. It is artificial to discuss sexual harassment as a discrete problem separated from
problems of racial harassment for women of color. Women of color who are subjected to
harassment at work face a complex mixture of racial and sexual harassment in which it is
impossible to separate what is racial harassment from what is sexual harassment. See
King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist
Ideology, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 42, 42 (1988) (arguing that "interactive
oppressions" of race, class, and sex "provide a distinct context for black womanhood").
Unfortunately, the courts have not recognized these interactive effects. For a discussion
of how courts treat multiple discriminations, see Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A
Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 45 (1981) ("Recognition that black
women are a distinct group in American society and that sex-race discrimination in em-
ployment exists is the first step in eradicating that discrimination."); Scales-Trent, Black
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The quiet revolution in sexual harassment law stands as a
powerful example of the potential effectiveness of consciousness
raising. In practice, consciousness raising and doctrinal law form
a dialectical relationship.9 Consciousness raising creates a social
Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV.C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 9, 9-11, 15-19 (1989) ("Black women have not been seen as a discrete group
with a unique history, unique strengths and unique disabilities."); Scarborough, Concep-
tualizing Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1473 n.113
(1989) ("A consideration of the experiences of Black women shows that they do not ex-
perience their discrimination merely as two discrete units 'piled upon each other.' The
starting point should be that a Black woman, as a whole being-a member of a distinct
class-can allege that she is being discriminated against as a 'Black woman.' "); see also
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that sex-plus analysis applies when Black women as a subclass of women are subject
to disparate treatment); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir.
1987) (supporting a sex-plus analysis of discrimination claims of women of color as dis-
cussed in Jefferies); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (adopting and
narrowing the Jefferies sex-plus analysis by stating that a plaintiff in a Title VII case
can claim only one plus characteristic; because women of color would use race as their
plus characteristic, they would be precluded, unlike white women, from using pregnancy
or marital status as a plus characteristic); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp.
925, 944 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986) (adopting the Jefferies sex-plus analysis); Graham v. Ben-
dix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (same); Degraffenreid v. General
Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (addressing a Black wo-
man's claims of race and sex discrimination as two distinct and separate causes of action
and finding that a consideration of the interaction of race and sex would create an unin-
tended "super remedy" for Black women); see generally B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (arguing that feminist theory is inadequate because it has
not accounted for the diversity of women's experience, including the experiences of
women of color and poor women). I am indebted to Birgit Seifert for suggestions for this
footnote.
9. See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 101 (1987) (discussing the consciousness-raising power
of law in relation to rape):
We live in a time of changing sexual mores, and we are likely to for some time
to come. In such times the law can bind us to the past or help push us into the
future. It can continue to enforce traditional views of male aggressiveness and
female passivity, continue to uphold the "no means yes" philosophy as reasona-
ble, continue to exclude the simple rape from its understanding of force and
coercion and nonconsent-until change overwhelms us. That is not a neutral
course. In taking it, the law (judges, legislators, or prosecutors) not only reflects
the view of (a part of) society, but legitimates and reinforces those views.
Or we can use the law to push forward. It may be impossible-and unwise-to
try to use the criminal law to articulate any of our ideal visions of male-female
relationships. But recognition of the limits of the criminal sanction need not be
taken to justify the status quo. As for choosing between reinforcing the old and
the new in a world of changing norms, it is not necessarily more legitimate or
neutral to choose the old. There are lines to be drawn short of the ideal. The
challenge we face in thinking about rape is to use the legitimatizing power of law
to reinforce what is best, not what is worst, in our changing sexual mores.
For a more pessimistic view on the relationship between life and law, see C. MACKIN-
NON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 57 (1979)
[hereinafter C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT]:
Life becoming law and back again is a process of transformation. Legitimized
and sanctioned, the legal concept of sexual harassment reenters the society to
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climate for rethinking doctrine in which legal decision makers
begin to construe facts differently. Reformulated doctrine rein-
forces social change and provokes more widespread conscious-
ness raising.1 °
This Note uses feminist reform of sexual harassment law to
show how the reconstruction of factual descriptions can lead to
change in the law. Part I describes the feminist methodology of
consciousness raising and analyzes Catharine MacKinnon's Sex-
ual Harassment of Working Women" as an example of a suc-
cessful consciousness-raising tool. Part II discusses sexual har-
assment doctrine and presents a case study illustrating how
changing the way legal decision makers think about facts can
lead to law reform. Part III discusses how social construction
theoryl2 aids understanding of changes in sexual harassment
law.
This Note emphasizes two points. First, MacKinnon's analysis
of male dominance and female subordination explains why
courts more readily accept men's versions of the experience of
sexual harassment and dismiss women's versions. 3 As a result of
participate in shaping the social definitions of what may be resisted or com-
plained about, said aloud, or even felt. Similarly, when a form of suffering is
made a legal wrong, especially when its victims lack power, its social dynamics
are not directly embodied or reflected in the law. Legal prohibitions may arise
because of the anguish people feel or the conditions they find insupportable, but
the legal issues may not turn on the social issues that are the reasons they exist.
Distanced from social life, yet part of its imperatives, the law becomes a shadow
world in which caricatured social conflict is played out, an unreal thing with very
real consequences.
10. Judges espouse great diversity of opinion regarding the consciousness-raising
power of law and the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in relation to
sexual harassment. E.g., Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1017-18 (8th Cir.
1988) ("Title VII does not mandate an employment environment worthy of a Victorian
salon. Nor do we expect that our holding today will displace all ribaldry on the roadway.
One may well expect that in the heat and dust of the construction site language of the
barracks will always predominate over that of the ballroom."); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Title VII is not a clean language act, and it does not require
employers to extirpate all signs of centuries-old prejudices."); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("Title VII was not meant to-or can
[sic]-change [sexual harassment]"); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784
(E.D. Wis. 1984) ("The requirement that the harassment be unreasonable assures that
Title VII does not serve as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the
hypersensitive.").
11. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9.
12. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).
13. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. In general, theories of dominance and
subordination suggest why some versions of the facts are accepted while others are dis-
missed. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 466:
The prevalence and acceptance of sexual harassment have its [sic] origins in a
history that has, for the most part and until recently, left men and not women in
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feminist consciousness raising by MacKinnon and others, how-
ever, women's versions have gained greater acceptance recently
in the courts. Second, future efforts at law reform should focus
on changing how legal decision makers think about facts.1"
positions of power, where they make decisions: as employers determining how to
respond to sexual harassment charges, as judges hearing sex discrimination
cases, and as writers and intellectuals expounding on sexual dynamics. As deci-
sion makers, such men determine and enforce cultural norms. To the extent
their insights and experiences are different from those of women, women's per-
ceptions are excluded and minimized.
See also Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073, 2079-80 (1989)
[hereinafter Scheppele, Telling Stories] ("Those whose stories are believed have the
power to create fact; those whose stories are not believed live in a legally sanctioned
'reality' that does not match their perceptions. 'We,' the insiders, are those whose ver-
sions count as facts; 'they,' the outsiders, are those whose versions are discredited and
disbelieved.") In relation to race issues, consider Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2411, 2438 (1989) ("The dominant
group justifies its privileged position by means of stories, stock explanations that con-
struct reality in ways favorable .to it.") (citation omitted). In-relation to gender issues,
consider A. DwoRKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987) (arguing that under our socially constructed
system of male dominance and female subordination, sexual intercourse is necessarily an
expression of inequality). In relation to race and gender issues, see B. HOOKS, supra note
8, at unnumbered preface:
Living as we did [Black Americans in a small Kentucky town]-on the edge-we
developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from the outside in
and from the inside out. We focused our attention on the center as well as on the
margin. . .. Our survival depended on an ongoing public awareness of the sepa-
ration between margin and center and an ongoing private acknowledgment that
we were a necessary, vital part of that whole.
14. Areas of law that involve socially dominant and subordinate groups are most ripe
for this type of reform. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 465 ("Success in continuing the
development of the law will depend on some extent on success in educating judges fur-
ther about the perniciousness of sexual harassment, but ultimately changing the law-or
the fact-of the sexual harassment will depend on changing fundamental relations be-
tween the sexes."); see also Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law (Book Review), 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1104, 1108-13 (1987) for a discussion of the "perceptual fault lines"
that exist between men and women, particularly with regard to sexual relations, and how
the law does not correspond to women's perceptions:
Women and men do have very different perceptions of experience, but in the
context of law one set of perceptions is hidden. Michel Foucault speaks of subju-
gated knowledges to describe such buried views. What remains-the perceptions
acknowledged, recognized, seen in law-is the socially constructed "objective"
point of view against which both men's and women's actions are judged by both
men and women. That point of view is the law. But it is not the point of view of
all.
Id. at 1112-13 (citations omitted). For a discussion of race and gender issues, see Mat-
suda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989) ("The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to at-
tain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the
world from the standpoint of the oppressed."). In relation to race issues, see Scarbor-
ough, supra note 8, at 1474 n.118 ("[Tlhe problem with the current legal interpretation
is that Black people's perspectives have not been used by judges in making their deci-
sions.") (citing J. Culp, A Black Perspective on the Law and Economics of Title VII
(1989) (unpublished manuscript)).
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These efforts should encourage legal decision makers to consider
how varying constructions of facts can produce different legal
results.
I. FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Consciousness raising plays an integral role in feminism and
feminist movements.1" Catharine MacKinnon called conscious-
ness raising the "method" of feminism."6 She defined it as "the
collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's so-
cial experience, as women live through it.11 7 In the 1970s in the
United States, thousands of women formed consciousness-rais-
ing groups "to raise awareness and understanding. . . awareness
that would prompt people to organize and to act on a mass
scale." '18 Feminist consciousness raising attempts to integrate the
theory and practice of changing the conditions under which
women live.
The most prominent proponent of sexual harassment law re-
form is Catharine MacKinnon, who in 1979 wrote Sexual Har-
assment of Working Women. 9 In practice, the revolution in sex-
15. Consciousness raising was also an important methodology of the civil rights
movement and the Black Power movement. Cf. Sarachild, Consciousness-Raising: A
Radical Weapon in FEMINIST REVOLUTION 144, 145 (1975).
16. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for The-
ory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 227, 231 (1982) ("Consciousness raising is the
major technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of
social change of the women's movement.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism]. But see Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 241-54
(1988) (critiquing consciousness raising and MacKinnon's use of it).
17. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, supra note 16, at 255; C. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 83; see also Cole, Getting There: Reflections on
Trashing from Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59,
88 n.120 (1985):
The term consciousness raising is used in this Article to refer to all concrete
situations in which the feminine (in women or men) plays an active role in criti-
quing the passive role by which society has defined the feminine. . . . Con-
sciousness raising describes an endless series of concrete experiences which serve
to deny the negativity of the feminine, to undermine restrictive social and per-
sonal roles, and so to affirm a woman's sense of self, and a person's sense of
fullness and freedom.
According to Cole, consciousness raising can be "a woman suing her employer for sexual
harassment" or a feminist book, like Sexual Harassment of Working Women. Id. As
presented in this Note, consciousness raising is a process, not a concrete action, though
an experience may be a part of the consciousness-raising process.
18. Sarachild, supra note 15, at 145.
19. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9. MacKinnon is a practitioner
as well as a theorist. She wrote the brief in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
[VOL. 23:3
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ual harassment law was a product of the work of thousands of
women who devoted themselves to changing how our society
thinks about sexual harassment. MacKinnon's book serves as a
symbol and a profound example of their collective work.
A. Sexual Harassment of Working Women: The Theory
MacKinnon's book was a major conceptual breakthrough in
feminist theory. She based her theory on the inequality of power
between the sexes. She criticized the prevailing theory of sex
discrimination-the differences theory-for failing to acknowl-
edge that generally men have power in society and women do
not.2 o
According to MacKinnon, the differences approach is the
prevalent theory that has been espoused by the United States
Supreme Court in discrimination cases.2 It holds that when
(1986), and included a sample brief in Sexual Harassment of Working Women. C. MACK-
INNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 233 (Appendix B).
20. Feminism is not a monolithic theory. In her review of Sexual Harassment of
Working Women, feminist Nadine Taub argues that in the short run MacKinnon's the-
ory of inequality "poses tremendous risks." Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686,
1691 (1980). Taub proposes merging MacKinnon's theory of inequality with the
predominate differences theory to address sexual harassment. Taub emphasizes the lim-
its of consciousness raising. Part of her disagreement with MacKinnon is based on "a
more pessimistic view of litigants' ability to educate the judiciary." Id. at 1695.
For a more expansive critique of MacKinnon, see Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (1990) (critiquing MacKinnon's
work because it essentializes the experience of all women as white women's experience,
thereby silencing Black women); Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 134-44 (1989) (criticizing MacKinnon for failing to incorporate
the perspectives and experiences of women of color into her theoretical framework). Un-
fortunately, this Note probably suffers the same limitations.
One does not need to agree completely with MacKinnon's analysis to appreciate its
power and influence in reforming sexual harassment law, specifically, and sex discrimina-
tion law, generally.
21. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 107. The doctrinal test of
Title VII in sex discrimination cases reflects the differences approach: to determine the
presence of sexual harassment "courts scrutinize the rationality of the relationship be-
tween a sex differentiation and the requirements of employment." Id. at 102. See, e.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that male-only draft registration did
not violate the equal protection clause because women are not similarly situated with
men regarding combat); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that
excluding pregnancy from disability coverage under an employer's insurance plan was
not sex discrimination under Title VII because women and men are not similarly situ-
ated with regard to pregnancy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (holding
that excluding pregnancy from coverage under California's disability insurance system
did not violate the equal protection clause because every classification concerning preg-
nancy is not sex-based). The Court in Gedulgig held that "[tihe [California insurance]
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
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women and men are similarly situated, they should be treated
similarly. Likewise, when women and men are not similarly situ-
ated, they should be treated differently.22 Under the differences
approach, sex discrimination occurs only when the sexes are
treated differently based on inaccurate or overgeneralized
grounds.
The inequality approach, on the other hand, begins with the
understanding that the social situation of the sexes is unequal.
"In this view," wrote MacKinnon, "men's and women's roles are
not only different; men's roles are socially dominant, women's
roles subordinate to them. The imagery of hierarchy, not just of
distinction, animates the [judicial] opinions."23 Legal doctrine
comes closest to accepting the inequality theory in the disparate
impact test of Title VII and the strict scrutiny test of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (which does not
apply to classifications based on sex).24
The differences approach conceals how power inequality per-
petuates sex discrimination because it does not comprehend the
reality of social inequality.2 To ask whether women and men
are similarly situated (as the differences approach does) ignores
the inequalities that prevent women from having the same op-
portunities as men in the first place. "Simply being a woman
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both
sexes." 417 U.S. at 497 n.20. In response to Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)), which
defined sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination.
Compare the standard of sex equality under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Originally, the test was "whether sex bears a 'rational relationship to
a state objective that is sought to be advanced.' " C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
supra note 9, at 102 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). In 1976 the United
States Supreme Court adopted an intermediate standard of scrutiny in sex discrimina-
tion cases. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."). What difference this elevation in standard makes remains
unclear.
22. MacKinnon accurately points out that the referent for the differences test is the
male. By making the male the standard against which deviations are judged, the differ-
ences approach obscures inequality and "rationali[zes] the social subordination of
women to men." C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 119.
23. Id. at 102.
24. Id. at 102-03. Race, national origin, and occasionally alienage are suspect classifi-
cations under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The strict scru-
tiny test is applied to classifications based on these categories. See, e.g., United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Korematsu v. United States 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AIIl legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
25. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 119.
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may mean seldom being in a position to be sufficiently similarly
situated to a man to have unequal treatment attributed to sex
bias," wrote MacKinnon. 8 By looking for discrimination only in
cases of substantial similarity, the differences approach conceals
the very inequalities that discrimination law is supposed to iden-
tify and eliminate.s7
For MacKinnon, inequality theory implies a political strategy
of redistribution of power. Her target is: "determinate acts, how-
ever unconscious, which preserve the control, access to resources,
and privilege of one group at the expense of another." 8 One of
those acts is the sexual harassment of working women.
MacKinnon defined sexual harassment as the "unwanted im-
position of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship
of unequal power."2 9 Her legal argument posited that sexual har-
assment of women at work is sex discrimination in employ-
ment.30 She argued that work provides an opportunity for
women to become economically self-sufficient and sexually self-
determinate through independence from men. Sexual harass-
ment, however, "undercuts woman's potential for social equality
in two interpenetrated ways: by using her employment position
to coerce her sexually, while using her sexual position to coerce
her economically."" Sex discrimination law, she asserted, should
provide a right and remedy for sexual harassment in
employment.
32
MacKinnon originated the distinction between quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment 33 that was later
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson.34 The addition of the hostile environment
26. Id.
27. See also C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 216:
Socially, one tells a woman from a man by their difference from each other, but
a woman is legally recognized to be discriminated against on the basis of sex
only when she can first be said to be the same as a man. A built-in tension thus
exists between this concept of inequality, which presupposes sameness, and this
concept of sex, which presupposes diference. . . .Sex equality becomes a con-
tradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron. The deepest issues of sex ine-
quality, in which the sexes are most constructed as socially different, are either
excluded at the threshold or precluded from coverage once in.
28. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 127.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is action-
able under Title VII). "Women's experiences of sexual harassment can be divided into
two forms which merge at the edges and in the world. The first I term the quid pro quo,
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theory greatly expanded the progressive potential of sexual har-
assment law because, as MacKinnon noted, hostile environment
harassment is "undoubtedly more pervasive.""
In Sexual Harassment of Working Women MacKinnon advo-
cated a woman-centered perspective of sexual harassment.
MacKinnon presented an alternative doctrinal theory, statistics
of the segregation, stratification, and income inequality that
women face in the workplace, and most important, women's per-
sonal stories of harassment. In describing her methodology of
using women's own observations about their lives to understand
sexual harassment, MacKinnon wrote:
When an outrage has been so long repressed, there will
be few social codifications for its expression. Depending
upon who is asking them and how, victims may initially
say (and believe) that they are not victims, so near is the
denial to erasure. Women's consciousness erupts through
fissures in the socially knowable. Personal statements di-
rect from daily life, in which we say more than we know,
may be the primary form in which such experiences exist
in social space; at this point they may be their only acces-
sible form.36
Given society's submerged understanding of sexual harassment,
one of MacKinnon's goals was to validate the experiences of
women and provide an alternative way for the courts to view the
facts of sexual harassment.
In uncovering sexual harassment, MacKinnon tackled one of
the most pervasive and accepted forms of oppression of women.
Her theory of the inequality of power between women and men
helps explain why courts more readily accept men's versions of
the facts of sexual harassment and dismiss women's versions.
MacKinnon's technique of using individual women's experiences
provides a strategy that shifts the legal system's descriptions of
sexual harassment to reflect more accurately the social reality of
sexual harassment for women. The tool of consciousness raising
has allowed MacKinnon to make the most persuasive case for
changing how facts are framed by legal decision makers.
in which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employ-
ment opportunity. The second arises when sexual harassment is a persistent condition of
work." C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 32. See also infra notes 39-
41 and accompanying text.
35. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 40.
36. Id. at xii; see also K. BUMILLER, supra note 2, at 2, 4 (discussing the relevance of
assessing the success of civil rights law from the victim's point of view).
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B. Sexual Harassment of Working Women: The Response
MacKinnon's impact on sexual harassment law "must count
as one of the more dramatic and rapid changes in legal and so-
cial understanding in recent years." 7 Numerous federal circuit
courts cited Sexual Harassment of Working Women for
originating the distinction between quid pro quo harassment
and hostile environment harassment. 38 The United States Su-
preme Court accepted MacKinnon's argument that sexual har-
assment is a form of sex discrimination in 1986 in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson.39
When MacKinnon began the book, no court had held that sex-
ual harassment was sex discrimination and several had held that
it was not. In the preface she wrote, "Since then, some courts
have agreed with the analysis presented here. The feeling that
the manuscript has been useful, perhaps even pivotal, in litiga-
tion establishing sexual harassment as a legal claim and term of
art has supported me in the rewriting."'40 MacKinnon's work, in
conjunction with the efforts of thousands of women who changed
37. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829
(1988). The claim that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, "for which
MacKinnon is given too little credit, seemed bizarre and radical to many when initially
put forward. Remarkably, MacKinnon's basic position was accepted in 1986 by every
member of the Supreme Court-with a majority opinion written by then Justice Rehn-
quist." Id. (citation ommitted).
38. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
MacKinnon for the proposition that two types of sexual harassment exist); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Henson citing MacKinnon);
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing MacKinnon extensively on the existence of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment). This was the first federal case to accept MacKinnon's clas-
sification. See id. at 943.
39. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (upholding the use of the hostile environment theory of sexual
harassment presented by MacKinnon).
MacKinnon's success in arguing that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
contrasts sharply with her failure in convincing others that pornography is a form of sex
discrimination. She attributed this difference to a number of factors. First, pornography
is a $10 billion a year industry whereas sexual harassment is not. Second, perpetrators of
sexual harassment do not identify themselves as perpetrators. Users of pornography have
a more difficult time ignoring their use of pornography. When "they all realize that
you're making illegal something that they do," they mobilize. The Pornographer's Neme-
sis, 21 MICHIGAN TODAY 5, 6 (June 1989) (interview with Professor MacKinnon).
40. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at xi. MacKinnon indicates
that the manuscript was written and circulated as early as 1975, four years before its
publication. This would account for the significant influence the work had, even prior to
its general availability. Id. See also Kay & Brodsky, supra note 2, at 673.
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the attitudes of those around them, was pivotal in altering the
legal and social meaning of sexual harassment.41
The challenge for MacKinnon and other feminists was two-
fold: to change legal doctrine to consider (if not reflect) women's
perceptions of sexual harassment and to alter how legal decision
makers view the facts of sexual harassment so women's points of
view are reflected. The Meritor decision demonstrates partial
success in response to the first challenge. The United States Su-
preme Court changed the legal doctrine of Title VII to encom-
pass the most pervasive form of sexual harassment-hostile en-
vironment harassment.42 In response to the second challenge,
recent cases demonstrate that feminist consiousness raising has
influenced some judges' descriptions of the facts in sexual har-
assment cases. The cases discussed in Part II confirm that femi-
nists, by challenging the way that legal decision makers view the
facts of sexual harassment, have succeeded in altering those
views.43
A conception of how to think about facts was explicit in Sex-
ual Harassment of Working Women and implicit in the doctri-
nal advances invented by MacKinnon. The courts, she argued,
had viewed sexual harassment almost exclusively from a male
point of view. In response, MacKinnon presented untold stories
of women's personal experiences. She showed how male domi-
nance and female subordination and the social construction of
gender roles help explain women and men's differing perceptions
41. Sexual Harassment of Working Women was reviewed in several major law jour-
nals. See, e.g. Kay & Brodsky, supra note 2; Taub, supra note 20; Book Note, 3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 203 (1980). One review chronicled the turnabout in the Court's treatment
of sexual harassment cases and gave credit for the "dramatic change" to MacKinnon.
Kay & Brodsky, supra note 2, at 673. Her book "was widely circulated in manuscript as
early as 1975 among many of the lawyers working on cases of sexual harassment prior to
its publication by the Yale University Press in 1979." Id. The authors credited MacKin-
non with encouraging victims to view sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
and to bring suits:
Even in such settings as the factory assembly line or the warehouse, the increas-
ing number of female workers who enter the workplace with a raised conscious-
ness concerning their rights and the demeaning implications of certain forms of
behavior can be expected to produce changes in the work culture that will re-
duce the frequency and severity of harassment. MacKinnon's book undoubtedly
will help to form that raised consciousness.
Id. at 693.
42. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 65 n.257 (1987) ("Some efforts to remake old categories to capture
women's experience have won success.") (citing C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
supra note 9).
43. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. From the cases, one can infer that the
task of changing how legal decision makers view facts of sexual harassment is enormous.
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of the same events." MacKinnon demonstrated that sexual har-
assment existed primarily in the form of hostile environment
harassment, a form the courts had not yet recognized. Her fac-
tual understanding of sexual harassment influenced her doctri-
nal suggestions.
MacKinnon's book alone did not change how legal decision
makers think about the facts of sexual harassment; it was an
influential part of a more generalized process. 5 Consciousness
raising as the methodology of the feminist movement relies on
thousands of individual, everyday actions that encourage people
to think differently about the socially embedded subordination
of women. Women questioned how the legal process had been
used to support the practice of sexual harassment and initiated
doctrinal and factual reform to force the law to respond to their
needs.
II. REFORMING SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW BY ALTERING
PERCEPTIONS OF FACTS
Sexual harassment law changed because judges and society at
large began to look at facts differently, not because courts sim-
ply decided a new theory was more appropriate. Facts previously
discounted could now be categorized under the rubric of sexual
harassment. This change occurred primarily because feminists,
particularly Catharine MacKinnon, used consciousness raising as
a method to change how we view the facts of sexual harassment.
The following discussion of sexual harassment doctrine and a
case study illustrate this change.
A. Sexual Harassment Doctrine
Courts rely on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prohibit sexual harassment in employment. Section 703 of Title
44. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 9, at 101 (citing S. DE BEAUVOIR,
THE SECOND SEX 249 (Bantam ed. 1970)), 105, 220-21; see supra note 14; see also, Sex-
ual Harassment in the Federal Government, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 64
(1979) at 93 (testimony of Eleanor Holmes Norton), 117 (testimony of Dorothy Nelms),
122-23 (testimony of Beryce MacLennan).
45. See MacKinnon, Introduction to Symposium: Sexual Harassment, 10 CAP. U.L.
REV. i, ii (Spring 1981) ("[It took a feminist movement to expose [sexual harassment] as
systematic and harmful in the first place, because feminism was the first politics to take
women's point of view on our own situation as definitive of that situation.").
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VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . .. sex ... ."46 On
its face this statute does not prohibit sexual harassment. It was
entirely conceivable that sexual harassment would never have
been found to constitute discrimination based on sex.
4 7
Two analytically distinct forms of sexual harassment are rec-
ognized by federal courts.48 First, when an employer conditions
employment opportunities upon sexual relations, it violates Title
VII under the "quid pro quo" theory. 9 If an employer threatens
to dismiss, demote, or eliminate some employment opportunity
unless the employee engages in sexual relations, the employer
violates Title VII. Similarly, promising an employee an employ-
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
Only equitable remedies are available under Title VII; plaintiffs may not receive com-
pensatory or punitive damages. The point of equitable relief is to "restore the victim of
discrimination to fruits and status of employment as if there had been no discrimina-
tion." Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the administrative body
charged with enforcing Title VII and other civil rights statutes in the employment con-
text. In 1980 the EEOC promulgated guidelines addressing sexual harassment in employ-
ment. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1980) (now codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1989)).
Those guidelines are not binding on the courts, but many courts have cited and applied
the EEOC guidelines. See Coley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich.
1982):
Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to pro-
mulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that title. Although the guidelines are
entitled to consideration in determining legislative intent, courts may properly
accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which
have the force of law or to regulations which under the enabling statute may
themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability.
Id. at 647 n.4; see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
47. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) ("The legislative
history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brev-
ity."). Title VII was originally intended only to protect the rights of people of color. On
the final day of consideration by the entire House, Representative Howard Smith (D.
Va.) added an amendment to prohibit sex discrimination in an attempt to thwart pas-
sage of Title VII. His plan backfired. The amendment passed the House the same day,
and the entire bill was approved two days later and sent to the Senate. 110 CONG. REc.
2577-84 (1964). Contra Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (presenting
the view that sexual harassment "is within the clear letter-and probably the spirit-of
Title VII" (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII with
regard to Black women, see Scarborough, supra note 8, at 1465-66.
48. State laws provide separate and additional bases for sexual harassment claims.
See, e.g., Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MicH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2102 (1985); Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act, WIs. STAT. § 111.36 (1987-88).
49. "Quid pro quo" means "something for something." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123
(5th ed. 1979).
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ment opportunity in exchange for sexual relations is a violation.
Title VII is offended in either case because the employee is
treated differently than members of the opposite sex with regard
to the allocation of benefits and the imposition of burdens of
employment.
6 0
Second, an employer violates Title VII if it subjects an em-
ployee to a hostile work environment.5' Hostile environment
harassment consists of harassment so severe or pervasive that it
alters the conditions of employment. The United States Su-
preme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, adopted the
distinction that the lower federal courts had acknowledged since
1981. 52 The Meritor decision proved a major victory for femi-
nists who argued that psychological (as opposed to economic)
forms of sexual harassment constitute sex discrimination in the
workplace. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
formulated a widely used test to determine the presence of hos-
tile environment sexual harassment in Henson v. City of Dun-
dee.6 Under the Henson test, a plaintiff carries the burden of
demonstrating that: 1) "The employee belongs to a protected
group" ;6 2) "The employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual
harassment . . . [in the form of] sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature";6  3) "The harassment complained of was based on
sex";57 4) "The harassment complained of affected a 'term, con-
50. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
51. The courts initially developed the hostile environment theory in a national origin
harassment case, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972):
[E]mployees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to
protection from employer abuse, and . . . the phrase "terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heav-
ily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. . . . One can readily envision
working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy com-
pletely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers ...
Id. at 238.
52. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(first federal case to identify the distinction).
53. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66; Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-46.
54. 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 903. Individuals may bring a discrimination action under Title VII based
on the following categories: race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1982).
56. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
57. Id.
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dition, or privilege' of employment";58 and 5) "Respondeat supe-
rior." '59 In a hostile environment action, the harassment must be
''sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment.""0
More recent United States circuit court of appeals decisions
modify the second element of the Henson test. Hostility not of
an explicitly sexual nature also has been found to constitute sex-
ual harassment. In 1985, one circuit court held that physically
aggressive but not explicitly sexual acts by a male supervisor
against a female employee may form a pattern of sexual discrim-
ination. 1 Two other circuit courts have explicitly accepted this
reasoning.2
To prove a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment,
the plaintiff must show either that the perpetrator intended his
actions or that his actions had the objectively predictable effect
of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work perform-
ance or work environment. In addition, the plaintiff must show
that she was, in fact, adversely affected. A plaintiff who en-
courages behavior that creates a hostile environment cannot suc-
ceed in a sexual harassment action. The test is whether the per-
petrator's actions were "unwelcome."6 4 The plaintiff must
indicate by her conduct that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome. Her claim is not moot if she voluntarily participates
in sexual relations as long as she previously indicated that they
were unwelcome. 5 Unfortunately, the plaintiff's "dress and per-
sonal fantasies" are relevant evidence on the issue of whether
the advances were unwelcome. 6
58. Id. at 904. Harassment may affect employment if "such conduct has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)
(1989).
59. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
60. Id. at 904.
61. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
62. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that predi-
cate acts underlying sexual harassment claim did not have to be sexual in nature: "In-
timidation and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result
from conduct other than explicit sexual advances."); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (remanding the case to consider evidence of threats of physical
violence and incidents of verbal abuse).
63. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
64. Id. at 68-69.
65. Id.
66. Id. For a discussion of the problems women face in bringing sexual harassment
claims in the wake of Meritor, see Dodier, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Sexual Har-
assment at Work, 10 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 203, 219-21 (1987) (arguing that allowing evi-
dence of plaintiff's dress and personal fantasies "places the victim rather than the ac-
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B. Sexual Harassment Facts: A Case Study
Fact descriptions from lower federal court opinions decided
since Meritor reflect a shift in how legal decision makers view
the facts of sexual harassment. 7 In addition to accepting the
hostile environment theory, some judges have begun to describe
the facts of sexual harassment cases differently to reflect
women's understanding of sexual harassment. This real change
in factual interpretation can profoundly affect the outcome of a
case.
The following case study, Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 68
demonstrates how the same situation can be described differ-
ently by different judges and how these differences can affect
the legal outcome. The trial court opinion and the majority and
dissenting opinions of the appellate court illustrate this claim.
The judges offer factual accounts that differ in describing the
severity of the harm and in focusing on the plaintiff's or the de-
fendant's behavior. The contrast between the lower court opin-
ion, appellate court opinion, and the appellate court dissent sup-
ports the claim that law can be reformed by reinterpreting
facts. 9
1. The lower court opinion- In 1984 a federal district judge
determined that Vivienne Rabidue did not prove a claim of sex-
ual harassment against her employer. The trial judge shaded the
facts to reflect that legal outcome. First, he downplayed the se-
verity of the alleged perpetrator's behavior. He "noted" that evi-
cused harasser on the defense"); Case Comment, A Right with Questionable Bite: The
Future of "Abusive or Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment as a Cause of
Action for Women in a Gender-Biased Society and Legal System, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv.
263 (1988) (arguing that the malleable Meritor standard is not very useful to women
fighting sexual harassment when women face pervasive gender bias in the courtroom).
See infra notes 78-81, 91-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of how sexual har-
assment trials and rape trials are similar in that both focus on the plaintiff's actions.
67. K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS, supra note 6, at 95, 103 ("The study of facts
reveals what the law-values."). This Note uses the fact descriptions in federal case law as
data because they are readily available. Interviews with victims and alleged perpetrators
of sexual harassment could also provide relevant evidence of a shift in perception.
68. 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
69. For three different descriptions of the same event, see Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff argued that her supervisor "reached over
and rubbed her thigh and said, 'I think you're going to make it.'" Id. at 1409. The super-
visor argued that the employee had "misconstrued an innocent and harmless gesture of
encouragement." Id. at 1410. The lower court found the same incident to be "an isolated
incident in which there was no sexual advance intended." Id. at 1411. The appellate
court remanded the case for further consideration of evidence evincing a hostile
environment.
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dence of sexual harassment consisted of "male employees occa-
sionally display[ing] pictures of nude or partially clad women in
their office and work area," to which the women employees were
regularly exposed. 0 He described Douglas Henry, the alleged
perpetrator, as a man who customarily made comments about
women generally, and, on occasion, directed such obscenities to
the plaintiff.71 The court's language minimized the harm to the
women employees.72
The trial judge described Henry's actions in much the same
way as the appellate judges described him in their subsequent
opinions:
Mr. Henry was a crude and vulgar man. He habitually
used vulgar language around the office. It was not un-
usual for him to make obscene comments about women,
and to use words like 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits.' On at least
one occasion Mr. Henry called plaintiff a 'fat ass.'17
But the trial judge described the women employees' reaction to
Henry differently. He stated that the plaintiff and other women
employees responded to Henry's behavior, not with outrage, but
by acting "annoyed."'7' In downplaying the seriousness of the
women's reactions, the trial judge minimized the harm done.
In its findings of facts, the district court discussed some
"facts" that are actually legal conclusions under the sexual har-
assment hostile environment test. For example, one prong of the
doctrinal test for hostile"'environment sexual harassment is
whether the behavior was sufficiently pervasive to interfere sub-
70. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.
71. Id.
72. Compare this attitude with Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(criticizing the lower court's characterization of sexual harassment as a "game" that the
perpetrators did not take "seriously'!; ."The record, however, contains nothing to support
[the lower court's] view, and indeed some evidence directly belies it."), and with
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (supporting the
plaintiff's version of the facts as constituting sexual harassment, not a "personality
clash," as the defendants argued, which would not violate Title VII because it was not
behavior based on the plaintiff's sex).
73. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.'See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615
(6th Cir. 1986) for a similar description of the alleged perpetrator.
74. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423. For an example of a difference in characterization
of the facts between the plaintiff and defendant, see Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010 (8th Cir. 1988). "Appellants argue that the nickname 'Herpes' is analogous to the
appellation 'Scarface,' which Al Capone wore proudly but which might bother a more
sensitive person. Brief of Appellant at 16." Id. at 1013 n.4. The defendants argued that




stantially with the plaintiff's employment. This test requires a
legal judgment. But the trial court instead employed a factual
analysis: "The vulgarity clearly was a problem, but not so perva-
sive a problem as to substantially interfere with plaintiff's em-
ployment."'7" The court again lapsed into a legal conclusion when
it suggested that the plaintiff's discharge was a "result" of her
"many job-related problems-in particular, her inability to work
harmoniously with customers and co-workers. 7' The district
judge conveniently made factual findings against the plaintiff
that were actually conclusions of law.
In a manner reminiscent of rape trials, the district court em-
phasized the plaintiff's behavior and minimized the relevance of
the alleged perpetrator's behavior." Althotlgh the court stated
that she "doubtless was an intelligent and ambitious person, "78
the phrasing made it apparent that the court intended to criti-
cize the plaintiff. The inevitable "on the other hand" follows the
court's praise: the plaintiff was a "troublesome employee," a per-
son who was "abrasive, extremely willful, and difficult to get
along with. T7 The judge ultimately held that the plaintiff was
not a victim of sexual harassment, finding that her work troubles
stemmed from her temper and stubbornness. The court found
that the plaintiff was not fearful at work; that the language and
posters did not affect her psychological well-being because they
were merely annoying, not shocking; and that the vulgarity con-
stituted a "fairly insignificant" .,part of the total job
environment."0
2. The appellate majority opinion- The plaintiff appealed
Rabidue to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which affirmed the trial court.8' One member of the
three-judge panel, Judge Damon Keith, concurred in the court's
judgment because of a technical argument that the successor
corporation was not liable for the actions of its predecessor. 2
But Keith wrote a dissenting opinion on the merits of the sexual
harassment and sex discrimination claims.8
75. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.
76. Id.
77. For another example, see infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text; see supra
note 66 and accompanying text for a discussion that the dress and personal fantasies of
the plaintiff are relevant evidence under Meritor.
78. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 432-33.
81. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 623 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 628 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
SPRING 19901
Journal of Law Reform
A well-established rule of law provides that an appellate court
shall only overturn factual findings of a district court if they are
"clearly erroneous."'8 ' As a result, facts tend to become reified on
appeal.8 5 The appellate court in Rabidue applied this standard,86
describing the facts similarly to how the district court had de-
scribed them. The appellate majority description, therefore,
sounds even further removed from the details and nuances of
the case.
Like the lower court, the appellate court concluded that even
though Henry's vulgar behavior was annoying, it was "not so
startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff
or other female employees. '"87 In a footnote the court character-
ized the facts of this case and distinguished them from cases in
which plaintiffs presented "more compelling circumstances" for
relief.8 8 After describing the facts of three successful sexual har-
assment cases, the court provided a description of the facts in
Rabidue that minimized the harm suffered by the plaintiff, simi-
lar to the district court's description.89 The court summarized
the evidence of harassment as being "limited to pictorial calen-
dar type office wall displa:rs of semi-nude and nude females and
Henry's off-color language. ' '90
In a fashion similar to the trial court's, the appellate court fo-
cused its factual account on the plaintiff. The majority implied
that the plaintiff was to blame for Henry's behavior. The plain-
tiff had an "abrasive, rude,. antagonistic, extremely willful, unco-
operative, and irascible personality." 91 Her charge of sexual har-
assment "arose primarily as a result of her unfortunate
acrimonious working relationship with Douglas Henry. '"92
Rabidue and Henry "were constantly in a confrontation pos-
ture. '93 The court's phrasing illustrates its position that Rabidue
was as much or more at fault than Henry for the treatment she
suffered at Osceola Refining Company.
84. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
85. But see Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 645-46 (1988) (arguing that in practice
the clearly erroneous standard is flexible and variable). Appellate courts may have sub-
stantially more control over the facts than the standard implies.
86. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615-16.
87. Id. at 622.
88. Id. at 622 n.7.
89. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
90. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622 n.7.





The court of appeals's doctrinal test also focused on the plain-
tiff. It adopted a subjective test within an objective test to deter-
mine the presence of actionable sexual harassment, ' stating
that the standard varies with the "personality" of each individ-
ual plaintiff and each work environment. 5 The court listed the
factors that must be taken into account in determining the pres-
ence of sexual harassment:
[T]he nature of the alleged harassment, the background
and experience of the plaintiff, her coworkers, and super-
visors, the totality of the physical environment of the
plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that per-
vaded the environment of the workplace both before and
after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, cou-
pled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon
voluntarily entering that environment."0
The list concentrates on the plaintiff. The defendant's absence
from the court's description of the relevant factors implies that
his actions are less important in rdetermining whether sexual
harassment occurred than the plaintiff's actions. 7
The trial court and appellate -majority's emphasis on the
plaintiff's behavior parallels the focus on the victim in rape tri-
als.98 Much of the testimony in rape trials has focused on the
victim's prior sexual relations and whether she consented to the
sexual contact. Feminists argued that this process put the vic-
tims of sexual assault on trial instead of the alleged perpetra-
tors. As a result of feminist activism, rape shield laws have been
implemented in numerous jurisdictions to restrict the use of tes-
timony regarding the victim's sexual history.9
94. The court stated that the trier of fact "must adopt the perspective of a reasona-
ble person's reaction to a similar environment under essentially like or similar circum-
stances." Plus, "the particular plaintiff would nevertheless also be required to demon-
strate that she was actually offended by the defendant's conduct and that she suffered




97. See supra notes 71-75, 77-79 and infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
98. Cf. S. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 47-51; Note, Rape Shield Laws-Is It Time for
Reinforcement?, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 317, 318-21 (1988) (authored by Catherine L.
Kello).
99. See Galvin, Rape: A Decade of Reform, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 163, 163 (1985); see,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. But see S. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 88-90 (reforming rape law to
focus on the defendant's behavior, instead of the victim's, was largely unsuccessful).
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Both the trial court and the appellate majority decisions in
Rabidue expressed the view that Title VII cannot and should
not be used to change the status quo. According to the trial
judge, Title VII cannot change behavior; 0 0 it was not "designed
to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers."' 01 In fact, what some persons consider to be
sexual harassment is a natural part of some work environments,
he claimed.102 In this view, "it cannot seriously be disputed that
in some work environments, humor and language are rough-
hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie
magazines may abound."' 03 Accordingly, from the trial judge's
point of view, statutes cannot and should not be used to change
behavior that naturally "abounds" in many work environments.
Similarly, the appellate majority reasoned that the defend-
ant's behavior was not sexual harassment in the context of our
society. The sexually explicit posters did not affect the work-
place "when considered in the context of a society that condones
and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of
written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time
television, at the cinema, and in other public places."' 4 The
judges' general attitude about sexual harassment in the work-
place seems to be: lump it or leave it.'0 5
3. The appellate dissenting opinion- The dissenter, Judge
Damon Keith, found that "[tihe overall circumstances of the
100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
101. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
102. Id. Socially constructed gender roles are routinely claimed to be "natural" be-
cause they are so pervasive and because they confirm the dominant role of the male
gender. "That the sex division seems natural may measure how deeply sex divides social
consciousness better than it measures the givenness of characteristics of the sexes or
justifies sex as a foundation for social disparity." C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
supra note 9, at 109.
103. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quotes
this language in agreement. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th
Cir. 1986).
104. 805 F.2d at 622.
105. Another federal district court took a contrary attitude in Arnold v. City of Semi-
nole, 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985). The Arnold court ordered a unique remedy to
counteract pervasive sexual harassment in a police department. "[I1n such a workplace,"
the court stated, "where sexual harassment is not only condoned by those in authority
but also is not admitted to be harassment and discrimination, it is imperative that edu-
cational efforts be instituted to prevent future occurrences." Id. at 870 (emphasis
added). As the court noted, the intent of the EEOC Guidelines is preventative, so the
employer must develop "methods to sensitize all concerned." Id. at 872 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)). Those methods include affirmatively raising the subject of sexual
harassment with all employees to inform them that it violates federal law and developing
a procedure to address claims of discrimination.
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plaintiff's workplace evince an anti-female environment. '"1 06 He
interpreted the same evidence considered by the majority .very
differently, and he discussed evidence from the record that the
majority chose to ignore. Judge Keith's dissent attempts to de-
scribe the experience of sexual harassment with greater atten-
tion to a woman's perspective."0 7
As evidence of the "anti-female" environment, Judge Keith
noted that the plaintiff worked for seven years as the only wo-
man in a salaried management position. 108 The plaintiff and
other women were "exposed daily" to sexually explicit posters. 0 9
Judge Keith employed a technique similar to those used in con-
sciousness raising to describe the working conditions of the
plaintiff and other female employees of Osceola Refining Com-
pany. He presented in explicit detail two examples of the type of
material to which the plaintiff was exposed:
One poster, which remained on the wall for eight years,
showed a prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts
with a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling
"Fore." And one desk plaque declared "Even 'male
chauvanist pigs need love." Plaiitiff testified the posters
offended her and her female co-workers.110
That he discussed this graphic evidence, available to the major-
ity as well, shows that, unlike the majority and the trial court,
Judge Keith found it particularly significant in deciding the le-
gal issues.
In contrast to the majority's description, Judge Keith wrote
that Rabidue's co-worker and sometimes supervisor Henry "reg-
ularly spewed anti-female obscenity.""' He "routinely referred
to women as 'whores,' 'cunt', 'pussy' and 'tits.' """ In relation to
Rabidue, Henry "specifically remarked 'All that bitch needs is a
good lay' and called her 'fat ass.'""
106. Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
107. Judge Keith presented two independent reasons to support his dissent: he dis-
agreed with the majority's characterization of the facts, and he would apply common-law
principles of agency to prove employer liability as..instructed by the United States Su-
preme Court. Although Judge Keith had a doctrinal disagreement with the majority, he
would have dissented solely on the differences in factual interpretation. Id. at 623-28.
108. Id. at 623.
109. Id.
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According to Judge Keith, Rabidue complained repeatedly
about Henry. She arranged a meeting with other female employ-
ees to discuss Henry and filed written complaints for herself and
other women who feared retaliation. 114 Although the vice-presi-
dent knew that employees were offended by Henry's language,
their solution was not to reprimand or fire him but to give him
" 'a little fatherly advice' " about his prospects for advancement
if he learned to become "'an executive type person.' "15
Judge Keith presented evidence from the record in his dissent
that the majority must have discounted because they did not
discuss it. He stated that the "plaintiff was consistently ac-
corded secondary status" as an employee. 116 She was the only
female in management, and unlike all male employees in man-
agement, she did not receive perquisites like free lunches, free
gasoline, a telephone credit card, or an entertainment account. 1 7
In addition, plaintiff was excluded from weekly golf matches.
She was not allowed to take clients to lunch, a practice common
to all of her male predecessors, because her supervisor thought it
was improper for a woman to take men to lunch. At the same
time, the supervisor complained that the company needed a man
in Rabidue's job because "'[slhe can't take customers out to
lunch.' ""8
Plaintiff was "frequently told to tone down and discouraged
from executing procedures she felt were needed to correct waste
and improve efficiency."'1 9 In contrast to the encouragement
Henry received from upper management, Rabidue was told that
she had "set her goals too high."' 120 According to Judge Keith,
"[n]ot only did plaintiff receive minimal support, but she was
repeatedly undermined," including an incident in which Henry
told his employees to ignore plaintiff's procedures and also per-
manently transferred some of her duties to a male employee who
filled in during her vacation. 2'
The dissenter did not ignore evidence regarding the plaintiff's
personality. He stated that "[tihe record establishes plaintiff
possessed negative personal traits."'22 Judge Keith, however,












but to poke holes in the reasonableness of the employer's ac-
tions. One of Rabidue's supervisors stated that she was not
forceful enough to collect on some accounts, but as Judge Keith
questioned, "how plaintiff can be so abrasive and aggressive as
to require firing but too timid to collect delinquent accounts is,
in my view, an enigma." '123 Negative personality traits cannot
justify discriminatory treatment, according to the dissent. 24
Judge Keith's fact descriptions influenced his doctrinal con-
clusions. First, he supported the rule that hostile environment
claims should be judged from the perspective of the reasonable
victim, not the reasonable person. He cited legal commentary to
support his view that women and men interpret behavior differ-
ently and the reasonable person perspective does not account for
that "wide divergence."'12 5 Judge Keith observed that, as a gen-
eral matter, women and men would provide different "factual"
accounts of the same situation. He concluded that the legal stan-
dard of the reasonable person is a male standard, and that sex-
ual harassment must be judged according to a reasonable victim
standard.
126
Second, according to Judge Keith, Title VII must actually
serve its purpose of preventing discriminatory "behavior and at-
titudes from poisoning the work environment of classes pro-
tected under the Act."' 27 Judge Keith criticized the majority for
upholding a standard under which "a woman assumes the risk of
working in an abusive, anti-female environment."'' 2 He chal-
lenged the majority's view that the behavior Rabidue was sub-
jected to has "an innate right to perpetuation.' ' 29 Judge Keith
analogized sexual harassment to slavery in that some men con-
123. Id. at 624.
124. Id. at 625. Judge Keith concluded:
[Tihe misogynous language and decorative displays tolerated at the refinery
(which even the district court found constituted a "fairly significant" part of the
job environment), the primitive views of working women expressed by Osceola
supervisors and defendant's treatment of plaintiff as the only female salaried
employee clearly evince anti-female animus.
Id.
125. Id. at 626.
126. Judge Keith assumed that the reasonable victim is a woman. "[U]nless the out-
look of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are per-
mitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in
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done and wish to perpetuate the behavior to their own
advantage.'
Judge Keith viewed the facts of Rabidue differently than the
appellate majority or the trial court. His description focused on
women's experience of sexual harassment, which influenced his
views on sexual harassment doctrine. His dissenting opinion il-
lustrates how legal decision makers can see the facts of sexual
harassment from a woman's point of view.
Rabidue illustrates how varying factual descriptions in the
same case can lead to different legal results. It shows how judges
can select and shape facts to fit their purposes. The trial court,
appellate majority, and dissent all had access to the same record,
but drew divergent pictures of what occurred. After framing dif-
ferent factual pictures, they reached different legal conclusions.
III. LAW REFORM AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FACTS
When we think of law reform, most of us think of altering le-
gal "doctrine"-the rules of law. In recent United States history,
numerous progressive changes have been achieved through doc-
trinal reform.'31 Despite these successes, the political strategy of
reforming law by concentrating solely on legal doctrine is too
simplistic.
Law is unique because of its dual concern with simultaneously
understanding and manipulating complex concepts and detailed
fact patterns. An additional method of law reform involves fo-
cusing on facts-the complementary strand to doctrine in the
legal weave. One method to change how legal decision makers
think about facts is consciousness raising. Feminists used con-
sciousness raising to alter how some decision makers view the
facts of sexual harassment.
If facts are half of the legal equation, we need a way to think
about and understand them. Social construction theory ad-
dresses how the "facts" of the same event can be described in
130. Judge Keith wrote that "[t]he presence of pin-ups and misogynous language in
the workplace can only evoke and confirm the debilitating norms by which women are
primarily and contemptuously valued, as objects of male sexual fantasy." Id. at 627.
It is significant that Judge Keith uses the analogy of slavery. As a Black man, Judge
Keith is a member of a socially subordinated group and his own experience of subordina-
tion may help him understand the experience of women's subordination.
131. The civil rights movement of the 1960s illustrates the benefits of doctrinal re-
form. Activists lobbied Congress to pass key pieces of legislation, including the Civil




multiple ways. It helps explain how three judges considering
Rabidue could describe the facts so differently. Social construc-
tion literature can also help explain how works like Sexual Har-
assment of Working Women influence the legal system by alter-
ing how legal decision makers view facts."'2
In his book Frame Analysis, Erving Goffman articulates a the-
ory of the social construction of reality.133 Goffman argues that
each of us "frames" particular events according to the social
constraints on our lives.1"4 When two persons describe a situa-
tion differently, neither of them is necessarily trying to deceive.
Instead, each person sees the same event through a different
frame.135
A social constructionist, while recognizing that some things
happen in the world and other things do not, focuses on how
each individual observes, processes, and retrieves information
differently."3 ' Our perceptions are the products of myriad fac-
tors, including our gender, race, class, social and physical envi-
ronment, stress level, and past experiences." 7 This is not to say
that we all would describe every event or situation differently.
132. This analysis attempts to capture how sexual harassment law was reformed
through consciousness raising. A similar but future-looking analysis discusses rape law.
In her book Real Rape, Professor Susan Estrich argues that society and the courts must
reconstruct the law of rape. S. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 4-7. Estrich delineates two types
of rape-real rape and simple rape-and shows that in practice even though real rape is
taken seriously by society and the courts, simple rape, rape involving acquaintances and
no weapons, is dismissed. Estrich's book is a consciousness-raising tool to encourage us
to rethink the facts and doctrines of rape law. See also Scheppele, supra note 14, at
1100-04 (discussing how Estrich successully "captures the worldview" in which real rape
and simple rape can co-exist).
133. E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE
(1974).
134. Id. at 21-26; see also Minow, supra note 42, at 45-50 (debunking the assumption
that an observer can see without a perspective and discussing how members of the
United States Supreme Court adopt this assumption); Fish, Normal Circumstances, Lit-
eral Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What
Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 268-
92 (1980) (arguing that words only have meaning because of their context).
135. Works of art and literature persuasively illustrate the social construction of real-
ity. See, e.g., R. AKUTAGAWA, In a Grove, in RASHOMON AND OTHER STORIES 19 (1952)
(Japanese short story revealing the subjectivity of truth through retelling the story of the
rape of a woman and the murder of her husband from numerous different perspectives);
Rashomon (Voyager Company 1950) (Japanese film based on In a Grove) (I am indebted
to Dora Rose for suggesting that I see this film); Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in THE
BEST SHORT STORIES OF 1917 (E. O'Brien ed. 1918) (by discussing her life, two women
discover why Minnie Foster killed her husband, while the men, who focus on "evidence"
at the "scene of the crime" are unable to do so).
136. See, e.g., E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979) (arguing that eyewitness tes-
timony is frequently unreliable).
137. Id. at 32-48 (describing factors that influence witness perception).
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Many of us tend to describe facts similarly because we share
similarities in social background and experience (some to a
greater extent than others).'38
To a social constructionist, each situation, including each legal
situation, can be described in an infinite (or at least a very large)
number of ways."3 9 These multiple descriptions of the same
event pull in different normative directions because the law
evaluates varying factual situations differently. In law, the doc-
trine tells an advocate how best to write a fact description given
her particular purposes."0 The doctrine suggests what informa-
tion is relevant to the outcome and how to structure a descrip-
tion to achieve a favorable result.
Legal opinions are similarly affected by the socially con-
structed character of our world."' Opinions follow a standard
format of presenting a facts section followed by a discussion of
how the law applies to the facts of this particular case. A judge's
"findings of fact" represent the judge's resolution of conflicts be-
tween the fact descriptions of the plaintiff (or the State) and the
defendant. Sometimes a judge will discuss each party's
"story"" 2 and present an analysis of why she did or did not ac-
cept one party's version of the facts. Judicial opinions reify facts
that could have been presented from another point of view. " 3
138. W. JAMES, Pragmatism's Conception of the Truth, in PRAGMATISM, 131-53 (R.
Perry ed. 1955) (arguing that truth is a process: we evaluate truthfulness according to
whether one thing is coherent with other things).
139. See Delgado, supra note 13, at 2418-35 (telling five different stories based on the
same events); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410-11 (1987) ("[lit really is possible to see
things-even the most concrete things-simultaneously yet differently"); see also E. LoF-
TUS, supra note 136, at 40-42 (discussing a psychological study that highlighted people's
perceptions of a football game: " 'It seems clear that the 'game' actually was many differ-
ent games and that each version of the events that transpired was just as 'real' to a
particular person as other versions were to other people.' ") (citing Hastorf & Cantrill,
They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 97 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 399 (1954)).
For a feminist critique of social constructionism, see Colker, supra note 16, at 217-22
(arguing that feminism helps each of us discover our "authentic" self, but social con-
structionists, including MacKinnon, deny that we each have an authentic self).
140. See, e.g., W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURT-
ROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 93-106 (1981) (discussing the rea-
sonable doubt standard of proof from the prosecution and defense perspectives).
141. Unfortunately, theories of legal interpretation generally ignore the interpreta-
tion of facts. Scheppele, Facing Facts, supra note 6, at 43 ("[W]riters on interpretation
in law have generally adopted a rather flat view of the law/fact distinction. Law is what
needs to be interpreted, but facts are simply true or false.") (citing, e.g., R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
142. See W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, supra note 140, at 93-115 for an analysis of the
American trial system as storytelling. See generally Legal Storytelling: A Symposium,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
143. See Minow, supra note 42, at 15:
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The three differing Rabidue opinions illustrate that legal deci-
sion makers can describe the same events differently and that
different factual descriptions can lead to different legal out-
comes. On one hand, the trial judge noted that "male employees
occasionally displayed pictures of nude or partially clad women
in their office and work area.'"1" Similarly, the appellate major-
ity suggested that the evidence of harassment was "limited to
pictorial calendar type office wall displays of semi-nude and
nude females and Henry's off-color language.'
45
The appellate dissent, on the other hand, characterized these
same incidents quite differently. Judge Keith wrote that
Rabidue's co-worker and sometimes supervisor "regularly
spewed anti-female obscenity,1' 46 with such epithets as " 'fat
ass' spoken directly to the plaintiff.1 47 He vividly described the
"anti-female" environment by pointing out that the plaintiff was
"exposed daily" to sexually explicit posters.1 48 These two de-
scriptions of the evidence of sexual harassment from Rabidue,
one relying on general descriptors like "calendar type wall dis-
plays" and "off-color language 14 9 and the other emphasizing
specific details of the posters and language, point out that differ-
ent descriptions connote real changes in the law. Differing char-
acterizations of the same events can lead to different legal
outcomes. 15 0
Once we see that any point of view, including one's own, is a point of view, we
will realize that every difference we see is seen in relation to something already
assumed as the starting point. Then we can expose for debate what the starting
point should be. The task for judges is to identify vantage points, to learn how
to adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to em-
brace in given circumstances.
Id.
144. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
145. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 n.7 (6th Cir. 1986).
146. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 623-24.
149. Id. at 622 n.7.
150. Changing how society and legal decision makers view facts will not necessarily
change victims' willingness to use legal strategies to vindicate discrimination. K. BUMIL-
LER, supra note 2, at 110-11:
[Sltrengthening the rule of law may not empower victims. The hostile image of
the law held by respondents considering legal recourse is a harsh reality com-
pared to the spirit of protective law that promises to give purpose and justice to
its beneficiaries' lives. In contemporary American society it is typically assumed
that the "rule of law" is strengthened by the increase in enforcement powers, the
clarification of goals, or the elimination of discretion, so that the right-bearer is
protected. Yet when people contemplate invoking the right of "equal treatment
under law," they find themselves in a position with only undesirable alterna-
tives. The bonds of victimhood are reinforced rather than broken by the inter-
vention of legal discourse.
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Understanding the socially constructed nature of our world
helps explain how changing the way legal decision makers think
about facts can reform law. Generally, the law favors the fact
descriptions of socially dominant groups. 5' In the case of sexual
harassment, legal decision makers accept men's versions of the
facts as more true than women's versions. Given this power to
define facts, the male perspective has dominated sexual harass-
ment law. Changing this privileged view of facts, as Judge Keith
does in his dissent in Rabidue, can reform the law.
152
Social construction theory also explains the consciousness-
raising potential of works like MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment
of Working Women to influence the legal system. If facts are
constructed, they can always be reconstructed. MacKinnon's
book uses women's personal stories of sexual harassment to ex-
plain how the facts could be otherwise. MacKinnon opens up the
possibility of seeing sexual harassment from the perspective of
the sexual harassment victim. Merely presenting a new way of
looking at sexual harassment does not ensure acceptance of that
view. Rabidue, however, demonstrates that consciousness raising
can change how some legal decision makers view the facts of sex-
ual harassment.
In the context of sexual harassment law, some legal decision
makers now view evidence that previously was not found to con-
Id.
Professor Bumiller continued by asking whether the language of rights is inherently
disempowering. She concluded that what is important is that rights are not self-enforc-
ing; they are realized within a social context. This Notes argues that consciousness rais-
ing changes the social context of sexual harassment. For a further discussion of rights in
this context, see Williams, supra note 139, at 405 ("CLS has ignored the degree to which
rights-assertion and the benefits of rights have helped blacks, other minorities, and the
poor."); see also Matsuda, supra note 14, at 8 ("Unlike the post-modern critics of the
left, however, outsiders, including feminists and people of color, have embraced legalism
as a tool of necessity, making legal consciousness their own in order to attack injustice.").
151. See supra note 13.
152. Consider an analogous case, the influence of the increasing numbers of women
jurors in rape trials:
Studies have shown that men and women have decidedly different perspec-
tives on the crime of rape that translate into differential willingness to convict
rape defendants. In general, women tend to have greater empathy for rape vic-
tims while men are more likely to see the defendant's point of view. Women are
also less likely to believe many of the rape myths....
[W]omen's greater likelihood to convict is not explained by consistent differ-
ences between men and women in punitiveness toward rapists. Rather, it can be
accounted for by differences in the way men and women view the strength of the
evidence in rape cases. It is therefore critical that both male and female perspec-
tives are represented on juries, as they usually are today. Conviction rates for
rape may be rising in part because of this better balance of perspective on the
jury.
V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 211 (1986) (citations omitted).
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stitute sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII. Using the
same doctrinal theories, decision makers look differently upon
similar external data and describe similar events differently.
Changing an outcome without changing doctrine is possible be-
cause facts are socially constructed by their creator. A person
can learn to look at the same evidence differently.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF LAW
REFORM
An expanded conception of law reform acknowledges the im-
portance of facts in legal decisions. Altering doctrine alone is
often insufficient to reform law because legal decision makers re-
main free to select and shape facts in accordance with their so-
cially influenced vantage point. To develop more effective strate-
gies of reform, activists should address the social construction of
facts and work to change how legal decision makers view facts.
Legal decision makers should recognize how they construct facts
to lead to certain legal outcomes and how facts could be de-
scribed otherwise.
Sexual harassment law illustrates this process. MacKinnon's
theory of the power inequality between women and men ex-
plains why past courts have more readily accepted men's ver-
sions of the facts of sexual harassment. Feminist consciousness
raising altered this view and allowed reformers to influence how
society and legal decision makers perceive the facts of sexual
harassment. The different factual descriptions in Rabidue illus-
trate that judges vary in their acceptance of a feminist concep-
tion of sexual harassment law. An increase in judicial opinions
like Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue would provide one mea-
sure of success in the effort to reform law through factual
reconstruction.
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